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Abstract: This paper assesses the degree of credibility of the Irish Pound in the European Monetary
System between 1983 and 1997. Different credibility indicators proposed in the literature are used
to measure agents’ perceptions of the credibility of the ERM commitment in an attempt to distinguish




he concern about excessive exchange rate volatility during the 1970s, and
its possible adverse effects on the process of European integration, prompted
the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in March 1979.
The decision to join the EMS from its inception has been identified as one of
the two strategic choices made by Irish policymakers in the post-war period
(McCormack, 1979).1 Indeed, after being linked with the Pound sterling since
1826, the Irish authorities had to weigh up the pros and the cons of participating
*The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and the Editor of this Review for helpful and
constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1.  The other choice was the move from protection to free trade and EU membership in the 1970s.152 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the absence of the main trading
partner.2 The view that Ireland’s firm commitment to the ERM would lead to
significant economic benefits won through. But these benefits crucially depended
upon the credibility of such commitment.
The aim of this paper is to assess the degree of credibility of the Irish Pound
in the ERM of the EMS during the 1983-1997 period. To that end, we use different
credibility indicators that have been proposed in the literature to measure the
agents’ perception towards the ERM commitments, trying to distinguish between
those events that stem from problems in the ERM from those that seem to be
exclusive to Ireland. This might help us to understand the evolution of the
behaviour of the Irish Pound during that period.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly discusses the EMS
and presents the credibility indicators. Section III contains the empirical results.
In Section IV we carry out a comparison of the credibility indicators used in this
study. Finally, Section V offers some concluding remarks.
II  THE EMS AND THE CREDIBILITY INDICATORS
As is well known, the main element of the EMS was the ERM, an adjustable
peg system in which each currency had a central rate expressed in terms of the
European Currency Unit (ECU). These central rates determined a grid of
bilateral central rates vis-à-vis all other participating currencies, and defined a
band around these central rates within which the exchange rates could fluctuate
freely. In order to keep these bilateral rates within the margins, the participating
countries were obliged to intervene in the foreign exchange market if a currency
approached the limits of its band. For this purpose, special credit facilities were
established. If the participants decided by mutual agreement that a particular
parity could not be defended, realignments of the central rates were permitted.
The fluctuation bands were originally set at ±2.25 per cent, but a ±6 per cent
band was set for Italy and the newcomers (Spain, the UK, and Portugal). After
almost a year of unprecedented turmoil in the history of the EMS, the fluctuation
bands of the ERM were broadened to ±15 per cent in August 1993 (except for
the Dutch guilder and the Deutschmark, which remained within the narrow
bands of ±2.25 per cent). On the other hand, there have been fifty-six
realignments during the 1979-1997 period, implemented in seventeen discrete
adjustments. Note also that thirty-eight of such realignments were made prior
to the currency turmoil of 1992/93.
It is common to divide the experience of the ERM in three periods (see, e. g.,
Higgins (1993)). The first one extends from the inception of the ERM in March
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1979 to January 1987, and is characterised by frequent realignments to correct
the divergence in economic fundamentals of the participating nations. The second
period (the so-called “new” ERM) lasted from 1987 to the end of 1991 and
coincided with increasing confidence in the ERM, with the removal of capital
controls, and with greater convergence in the economic fundamentals. The third
period covers the successive crises of September 1992 and August 1993, the
German unification and the recession in Europe, widely accepted as the
underlying causes of such crises (see, e.g., Commission of the European Com-
munities (1993)). We can also consider a new period which began with the
broadening of the fluctuation bands to ±15 per cent in August 1993 and was
characterised by volatility levels comparable to those prevailing before the crisis
(see, e.g., Sosvilla-Rivero et al. (1999)).
The ERM is the most prominent example of a target zone exchange-rate
system. There exists an extensive literature that builds on the seminal paper
by Krugman (1991) and studies the behaviour of exchange rates in target zones.
The main results of the target zone model is that, with perfect credibility, the
zone exerts a stabilising effect (the so-called “honeymoon’’ effect), reducing the
exchange rate sensitivity to a given change in fundamentals. Nevertheless, in a
target zone with credibility problems, expectations of future interventions tend
to destabilise the exchange rate, making it less stable than the underlying
fundamentals (Bertola and Caballero, 1992).
Credibility can be defined in the degree of confidence that the economic agents
assign to the announcements made by policymakers. In the context of an
exchange rate target zone, like the EMS, credibility refers to the perception of
economic agents with respect to the commitment to maintain the exchange rate
around a central parity. Therefore, the possibility for the official authorities to
change the central parity could be anticipated by the economic agents, triggering
expectations of future changes in the exchange rate that can act as a destabilising
element of the system.
In this section we present the four credibility measures that we have used in
this paper and that have been widely used in the empirical literature.
2.1 Svensson’s Simple Test
Svensson (1991) presented a simple test to study the credibility of a target
zone exchange rate regime with fluctuation bands. There are two traditional
versions of this test. In the first one, it is assumed that there is no arbitrage,
while in the second version uncovered interest parity (UIP) is assumed to hold.
In order to compare this indicator with the one based on the drift-adjustment
method (see subsection 2.2), a more recent variant of the former is usually
estimated. Given that the log of the exchange rate st can be expressed as stºxt+ct,
where xt is the deviation of the log exchange rate from the log central parity ct,154 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
the expected rate of currency depreciation within the band from time t to time
t+t is bounded by:
   (xt - xt)/t£Et[Dxt+t]/t£(xt - xt)/t (1)
Taking into account the UIP hypothesis:
   it - it
* = Et[Dst+t]/t (2)
and by separating the two elements of the exchange rate, i.e., the central parity
and the exchange rate within the band, Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
   it - it
* = Et[Dxt+t]/t+Et[Dct+t]/t (3)
where it and    it
* are the domestic and the foreign interest rate, respectively, and
t is the maturity (being 3/12 for a 3-month maturity).
Thus, the expected variation rate in the exchange rate can be separated in
two components: the expected rate of depreciation within the band and the
expected rate of realignment of the central parity.
By using Equations (1) and (3), the expected rate of realignment is bounded
according to:
   it - it
* - (xt - xt)/t£Et[Dct+t]/t£it - it
* - (xt - xt)/t (4)
In order to facilitate the comparison with the drift adjustment method, we
calculate a 100 per cent confidence interval for the expected rate of realignment
of the Irish pound/German mark exchange rate.
This recent version of Svensson’s simple test has been criticised because it
only takes into account the possibility of realignments in the limits of the band,
thus placing an excesive weight on credibility. This is one of the reasons why
the results obtained with this test must be considered with care.
2.2 The Drift-adjustment Method
This method, originally proposed by Bertola and Svensson (1993), computes
an econometric estimate of the expectations of the economic agents regarding
the realignment in the ERM. These realignment expectations constitute an
inverse measure of credibility. The drift-adjustment method assumes UIP to
hold,3 using the modified expression (3).
3. Svensson (1992) and Ayuso and Restoy (1992) have estimated insignificant risk premia for
the currencies in the ERM and, hence, the expected rate of depreciation is closely related to the
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Moreover, if    pt
t denotes the probability at time t of a realignment during the
period from time t to t+t, it follows that:
   Et[Dxt+t] = (1- pt
t)Et[Dxt+t /n r]+ pt
tEt[Dxt+t /r] (5)
where the expectation terms on the right-hand side are conditional either to the
absence of realignment (nr) or to the presence of realignment (r).
If    gt







Et[xt+t /r]- Et[xt+t /n r] {} (6)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the expected rate of realignment,
whereas the second term is the expected rate of depreciation within the band
when a realignment takes place.
Combining (3) and (5), and using (6), we obtain:
   gt
t = it - it
* - Et[Dxt+t /n r]/t (7)
The procedure implies first estimating the expected rate of depreciation within
the band (the last term on the right-hand side in (7)), and then computing the
expected rate of devaluation    gt
t. Once    gt
t is estimated, the corresponding 90 or
95 per cent confidence intervals can be calculated. These intervals can be com-
pared with those of the more recent version of Svensson’s simple test.
As for the practical implementation of the drift-adjustment method, the empirical
works that have computed this measure have used different econometric
specifications for the expected rate of depreciation within the band. On one
hand, Lindberg et al. (1993), Svensson (1993), and Rose and Svensson (1994)
estimate a linear regression model where the exchange rate in t+t depends on
its value in moment t (and, in some cases, lagged exchange rates) and on the
interest rate differential. On the other hand, Bertola and Svensson (1993)
consider xt as the only explanatory variable, assuming a mean-reverting model
for the exchange rate within the band, as in Ayuso et al. (1993) and in Gómez
and Montalvo (1997).
In this paper, the drift-adjustment method has been used to calculate the 90
per cent confidence intervals for the expected rate of devaluation. To that end,
we have estimated the expected rate of depreciation within the band using a
linear regression model where the exchange rate and the domestic and foreign
interest rate are taken as explanatory variables.
The drift-adjustment method has also suffered several criticisms. In particular,156 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
it has been pointed out that the selection of the explanatory variables is ad
hoc, without an appropriate theoretical framework. Furthermore, the non-
stationarity of the exchange rate may generate some problems in the estimation
of its expected rate of variation. These problems depend on its position within
the band. Thus, it is necessary to exert important care when we are interpretating
the results obtained from this method.
2.3 Models of Discrete Choice
These kinds of model aim to estimate the probability of realignment by means
of econometric techniques. To that end, we consider some explanatory variables
of that probability, assuming normal or logistic distributions. Among the
explanatory variables, the interest rate differential, the inflation differential,
the current account balance, and the unemployment rate are usually considered,
leading to estimations using monthly or quarterly data.
Edin and Vredin (1993) use a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1976)
to calculate both the probability and the expected size of the devaluation. In the
first step of the estimation procedure, the probability of devaluation occurring
at time t+1 based on information available at time t is estimated. In the second
step, the unconditional expectation of the rate of devaluation in period t is
obtained.
2.4 Marginal Credibility
This credibility measure proposed by Weber (1991a) focuses on the ability of
policy announcements to influence the public’s expectations. It measures the
impact of official announcements on exchange rate and may be thought of as
the weight placed on the announcement when the public forms its expectations.
This credibility measure is equal to one if the policymaker always makes fully
credible announcements, and tends to zero as the announcements become non-
credible. Marginal credibility (a) is defined as:
   st - Et-1[st] =g+a [ct - Et-1[st]]+ ut (8)
where the expectation operator is conditional to the information available in
t–1, and where ut is a random disturbance.
A model of the public’s expectations formation process is required in order to
estimate a. By applying the Kalman filter, a can be estimated, obtaining a
different value of a for each moment in the sample period, allowing the study of
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III  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The credibility indicators introduced in the previous Section have been applied
to daily exchange-rate data of the Irish pound. Our exchange rates are expressed
vis-à-vis the Deutschmark. The database used is composed of daily (mid-market)
spot rates gathered by the Bank of Spain at 13:15 (GMT). The sample period
runs from 21 November 1983 to 17 February 1997 (around 3,265 observations).
We will present the results following the same sequence we used in the last
Section when introducing the credibility indicators.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the Irish pound/Deutschmark exchange
rate.4 After the broadening of the fluctuation bands to ±15 per cent on 2 August
Figure 1: Irish Pound-Deutschmark Exchange Rate (including ERM
Intervention Limits)
4. The fluctuation bands were built by following Honohan (1979). So we take into account the
lack of symmetry between the two intervention limits due to the requirement that the upper
intervention limit for currency X with respect to currency Y equals the lower intervention limit for
currency Y with respect to currency X.
Notes: CENTRALP = central parity
LL = lower limit
UL = upper limit
IRLDM = Irish Pound-Deutschmark exchange rate158 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
1993 (observation 2,413), we observe a depreciation episode until 6 March 1996
(observation 2,795), followed by an appreciation period.
3.1 Svensson’s Simple Test
Using the three-month interbank rate, and as mentioned in Subsection 2.1,
we calculated the more recent version of Svensson’s simple test, obtaining the
100 per cent confidence bands for the expected rates of devaluation using expres-
sion (4). In this way, the maximum and the minimum expected realignment are
constructed by subtracting from the interest rate differential the minimum and
the maximum possible rates of depreciation within the band, respectively. The
resulting expected rates of realignment are displayed in Figure 2. As can be
seen, the difference between the maximum and minimum realignment increases
after the broadening of the fluctuation bands to ±15 per cent on 2 August 1993
(observation 2,413).
Figure 2: Maximum and Minimum Expected Rates of Realignment
Notes: MIN = minimum expected rate of realignment in the Irish Pound-Deutschmark
exchange rate, based on Svensson’s simple test.
MAX = maximum expected rate of realignment in the Irish Pound-
Deutschmark exchange rate, based on Svensson’s simple test.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.
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This simple test does not seem to be very informative, since its sensitivity to
the thickness of the fluctuation bands as can be seen from its behaviour since
August 1993.
3.2 The Drift-adjustment Method
As mentioned above, in order to compute the expected devaluation rate using
Equation (7), we have to estimate the expected rate of depreciation within the





=a jdj +b1xt +b2it
* +b 3it +e t+t
j
å (9)
where xt+t and xt are the exchange rate’s (log) deviation from the central parity
in period t+t and t, respectively, and where it and    it
* are the Irish and German
three-month interest rates, respectively. The variables dj denote the dummies
for the subperiods between the realignments and the widening of the bands.5
Svensson (1993) eliminates from the sample the 65 observations corresponding
to the three months before a realignment took place, given that he, like us, uses
t= 3 months. But given the important reduction in the number of observations
implied by this strategy, we estimate Equation (9) using the whole sample.6 In
this way, we are estimating the expected devaluation rate within the band that
includes possible jumps in each realignment. Therefore, we obtain the expected
rate of realignment, but not the expected devaluation rate    gt
t   (which, in addition,
includes the expected jump in the exchange rate within the band in the realign-
ments).
Table 1 shows the results of OLS estimation of (9), where the standard errors
have been corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity which neces-
sarily results from the “overlapping observations” problem, with a Newey-West
covariance estimator. As can be seen in Table 1, all the estimated coefficients
are clearly significant. The coefficient for xt is negative, indicating mean-
reversion of the exchange rate within the band. In addition, the “t value” for the
coefficient is –3.48, safely rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root, as in
Svensson (1993). The estimated signs are in accordance with those reported by
Svensson (1993) and by Rose and Svensson (1994). Finally, all the dummy
variables are significant, indicating the relevance of the different “regimes” in
the history of the Irish pound in the ERM.
5. O’Donnell (1995) did not consider the widening of the bands, since her data went up to June
1993. In this paper we have also taken into account this event since it has produced a major change
in the ERM, as can be observed in a greater fluctuation of the exchange rate before August 1993.
6. Gómez and Montalvo (1997) follow a similar approach.160 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW



















Notes: OLS estimation of Equation (9). Newey-West standard errors  within  parentheses.
Di denote dummy variables for the six subperiods delimited by the realignments of the
Irish Pound and the widening of the bands.
The estimated expected rate of realignment from Equation (7) and the 90 per
cent confidence interval are both presented in Figure 3. As can be seen, for most
of the sample the hypothesis that the expected rates of realignment are zero
cannot be rejected.
Nevertheless, we detect four episodes where the expected rate of devaluation
is positive: (i) before the realignment of the Irish pound on 7 April 1986 (obser-
vation 596); (ii) the period from before the realignment of the Irish pound on
4 August 1986 (observation 679) to the realignment on 12 January 1987 (obser-
vation 788); (iii) around the realignment of the Irish pound on 1 February 1993
(observation 2,289),7 and (iv) around the devaluation of the Spanish peseta and
the Portuguese escudo on 6 March 1995 (observation 2,795). In addition, after
the Italian lira rejoined the ERM on 25 November 1996 (observation 3,213),
there seems to be an increase in the expected rate of appreciation.
3.3 Models of Discrete Choice
Instead of estimating the probability of realignment proposed by Edin and
Vredin (1993), we have estimated the value of that probability using the same
daily data used in all the other credibility indicators analysed in this paper.
7. Bartolini (1993) also found the importance of this realignment of the Irish pound. Even he
argues that it was an excesive devaluation in comparison to the investors expectations.ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IRISH POUND IN THE EMS 161
Figure 3: Expected Rate of Realignment (Including 90 Per Cent
Confidence Intervals)
Notes: RR = expected realignment rate in the Irish Pound-Deutschmark exchange rate,
based on estimation results in Table 2.
UL = 90 per cent confidence interval’s upper limit.
LL = 90 per cent confidence interval’s lower limit.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.
We have estimated a logit based on the following expression:
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where F(·) is the logistic distribution function (so that F(l) is the probability
that normally distributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance
does not exceed l), z1t denotes an explanatory variable, and P(yt=0)=1–Pt. The
parameters in (10) are estimated maximising the logarithm of the likelihood
function with respect to individual observations:
  
LogL = yt logF(zt








Note that the estimated parameters should be interpreted in relative terms.
In Section 2.2 it was explained that the drift-adjustment method estimates
the 90 per cent confidence interval, which was later on calculated in Section162 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
3.2. If both limits of the interval were simultaneously greater or lesser than
zero, the agents would expect realignments with 90 per cent of confidence. Thus,
assuming that when yt=0 there is no credibility and that when yt=1 there is
credibility, we use the drift-adjustment method to design the logit model. In
other words, when yt=0 the limits of the confidence interval for the expected
rate of realignment are simultaneously greater or lesser than zero. When yt=1
that does not occur.8 This strategy allows us to obtain the probability that agents
assign to the credibility of the exchange rate regime in each moment of time.
We have used different approaches to estimate the probability that Irish
commitments towards the ERM were credible, defining as the explanatory
variable zt: either the Irish pound/German mark exchange rate, or the distance
to the upper fluctuation band, or the distance to the central parity, or the interest
rate differential. Moreover, we have also considered the Irish pound/British
pound exchange rate and interest rate differential with respect to the United
Kingdom.9 The latter tries to capture the effects of the competitiveness between
Ireland and United Kingdom and its influence in the credibility level (Thom,
1995). Table 2 shows the estimation results using each one of these six options,
while in Table 3 we present the associated summary statistics of their estimated
probability.
Table 2: Logit Estimation Results
Parameters Irish Pound/ Distance Distance Interest Irish Pound/ Interest
Deutschmark to to Rate Pound Rate
Exchange Upper Central Differential Sterling Differential
Rate Band Parity with Exchange with
Germany Rate UK
d1 4.82 1.89 2.77 5.20 12.64 2.73
(0.69) (0.07) (0.08) (0.20) (0.89) (0.08)
d2 –6.71 21.89 –76.37 –0.55 –10.99 –0.46
(1.79) (3.55) (6.21) (0.03) (0.92) (0.03)
Note: Estimation of Equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.
As can be seen in these tables, in general the estimated coefficients are all
statistically significant, and the estimated (credibility) probabilities have a mean
of 0.9, suggesting a subjective probability 0.1 of realignment. The sign of the
parameters for each one of the explanatory variables is the expected one.
8. Note that this measure, when formulated in this manner, assigns credibility to any period
when neither the lower bound of the confidence interval is positive nor the upper bound is negative.
9. In order to save space, we only present here the results for two explanatory variables: the
interest rate differential between Ireland and Germany and between Ireland and the UK. The
results obtain with the other variables can be found in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2000).ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IRISH POUND IN THE EMS 163
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Estimated Probability
Parameters Irish Pound/ Distance Distance Interest Irish Pound/ Interest
Deutschmark to to Rate Pound Rate
Exchange Upper Central Differential Sterling Differential
Rate Band Parity with Exchange with
Germany Rate UK
Mean 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906
Median 0.909 0.889 0.931 0.976 0.930 0.944
Maximum 0.936 0.986 0.941 0.998 0.985 0.995
Mínimum 0.854 0.869 0.398 0.087 0.634 0.010
Std.Dev. 0.019 0.034 0.072 0.140 0.068 0.134
Skewness –0.324 1.103 –3.562 –2.206 –1.237 –3.945
Kurtosis 2.459 2.492 16.945 7.797 4.241 21.414
Note: Estimation of Equation (10). Standard errors within parentheses.
Time series of the probability of credibility have been calculated using the
estimation results of Table 2. These estimations are plotted in Figures 4 and 5.
Figure 4 plots the results obtained using the interest rate differential with
respect to Germany as the explanatory variable. As shown, this indicator suggests
Figure 4: Estimated Devaluation Probabilities Based on the Irish-German
Interest Rate Differential
Notes: Inverse of devaluation probabilities for the Irish Pound-Deutschmark
exchange rate, based on estimation results in Table 3, column 5.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation bands.164 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
a temporary fall of credibility at the end of 1984. Furthermore, it captures both
the devaluations of the Irish pound and the realignments of April 1986, August
1986, and January 1987. Moreover, it can be observed an important fall in
credibility with the crisis of the ERM in September 1992.
The importance of commercial and financial relationships between Ireland
and United Kingdom made us introduce the Irish pound/British pound exchange
rate and the interest rate differential between these economies as explanatory
variables for the probability. Following Kremers (1990), Walsh (1993b), Honohan
and Conroy (1994), and Thom (1995), Irish competitiveness in relation to United
Kingdom may influence the degree of credibility of the Irish pound with respect
to the German mark.
In Figure 5 we show the probability of credibility using the interest rate dif-
ferential between Ireland and the United Kingdom. We observe that the devalu-
ations of the Irish pound in 1986 and 1987 compensate the previous period of
lack of credibility. Around the suspension of the participation of the sterling
in the ERM in 1992, credibility fell dramatically. However, the devaluation of
February 1993 and the broadening of the bands allowed for the return to the
previous level of credibility.
Figure 5: Estimated Devaluation Probabilities Based on the Irish-British
Interest Rate Differential
Notes: Inverse of devaluation probabilities for the Irish Pound-
Deutschmark exchange rate, based on estimation results in Table
3, colum 7.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of
fluctuation bands.ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IRISH POUND IN THE EMS 165
3.4 Marginal Credibility
As mentioned in Section II, marginal credibility focuses on the influence of
policy announcements on the expectations of private agents, and may be thought
of as the weight placed on such announcements when forming expectations.
In this paper, the announcements are changes in the ERM central parity.
The estimation of marginal credibility (a) is based on Equation (8), where the
random disturbance ut is normal with a zero mean and a constant variance.
Before estimating a, we have to obtain the expectations on the exchange
rate. To that end, we generate the expected exchange rate using a random walk
with a drift.10
To estimate marginal credibility, we have used the Kalman filter in order to
analyse the dynamic behaviour of the estimated at during the sample period.
As it is well known, the Kalman filter is an updating estimation method which
bases the regression estimates for each time period on the last period’s estimates
plus the data for the current time period (i.e., it bases estimates on data up to
and including the current period).
The model that has been estimated is the following:
   yt = wtbt +e t;  et ~N( 0 ,s
2ht) (12)
   bt = Tbt-1 +h ;  ht ~N( 0 ,s
2Qt) (13)
where yt is a vector of differences    st - Et-1(st),    wt
©  is a row vector made of one
and differences    ct - Et-1(st). Equation (13) is called the transition equation
(which describes the evolution of a set of state variables), whereas Equation
(12) is the measurement equation (which describes how the data actually
observed is generated from the state variables). bt is the state vector and it
follows a random walk; and T is an identity 2x2 matrix. The initial conditions
are established by b0~N(b0, P0), where P0 is a variance-covariance matrix for
the initial conditions. Finally, ht is the variance of the errors in the measure
equation and Qt is the variance-covariance matrix for the errors in the transition
equation.
The Kalman filter is a recursive method that computes the optimal estimate
of the state variables in period t, based on information available in time t. For
each period, we use a conditional maximum likelihood to the information set up























10. Other specifications, such as traditional ARIMA models, were also tried but they did not
change the qualitative results.166 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
where s2 is computed from the recursive residuals,    f t = wt
©Pt/t-1wt + ht is a
scalar and    xt = yt - Et-1[yt].
The use of an econometric technique that allows for changes in the values of
the parameters along time may be appropriate for the study of credibility in a
target zone, i.e., stabilising interventions by the central banks, speculative
movements by private agents, and realignments modify the parameters of the
process along the period studied. In fact, this possibility was pointed out by
Weber (1991a, 1991b) after the monetary turmoil of September 1992, and more
recently by Darvas (1998).
Table 4 shows the estimation results. Note that the upper panel in that table
reports OLS estimates of a as a benchmark for comparisons.










Notes: Estimation by maximum likelihood (ML).
Standard errors within parentheses.
Figure 6 displays the evolution of the estimated marginal credibility when
the expected exchange rates are based upon a random walk model with a drift.
As can be seen in this figure, the dynamic behaviour of the credibility indicator
is not as irregular as previous indices. Indeed, we only detect two significant
episodes: a temporary increase in credibility from 23 March 1986 (observation
590) up to just after the realignment of the Irish pound on 4 August 1986
(observation 679), followed by a reduction in credibility until the realignment of
12 January 1987 (observation 788). After this first episode, there is a rise in
credibility until the realignment of the Irish pound on 1 February 1993 (obser-
vation 2,289). At the end of 1992 and begining 1993, just after the crisis, there
is a stop in the improvement in credibility that led to the devaluation of February
1993. According to this indicator this realignment was not enough to return to
the path of credibility gains. After the Italian lira rejoined the ERM on
25 November 1996 (observation 3,213), there is a slight decline in credibility.ON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IRISH POUND IN THE EMS 167
Figure 6: Marginal Credibility
11. The choice of a subperiod prior to each one of the four selected events tries to capture the
predictive quality of the different measures. Nevertheless it must be pointed out that we are not
taking into account the number of events registered by each indicator; this last element could have
been an alternative criterium in order to carry out the comparison.
12. The Svensson’s simple test was eliminated given the mentioned sensitivity to the size of the
fluctuation bands.
Notes: Credibility indicator based on estimation results in Table 5.
Vertical lines = actual ERM realignments and broadening of fluctuation
bands.
IV  COMPARISON OF INDICATORS
We have carried out a study for each indicator of the changes of the first and
second order moments prior to the main events of the sample period, in order to
illustrate the differences among the credibility indicators used in this paper. In
this way, we chose the fifteen days prior to the following events: 4 August 1986
(the devaluation of the Irish pound), 14 September 1992 (the worst moment of
the monetary turmoil), 1 February 1993 (the devaluation of the Irish pound),
and 2 August 1993 (the broadening of the bands).11
Once we calculated the mean and the standard deviation for the whole period
as well as for the four subperiods, we measured the percentage differences
between the values for each one of these subperiods and the corresponding values
for the complete period. Then, we ordered the eight12 indicators from the greatest168 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
to the smallest degree of detection of the selected events (i.e., from the greatest
to the smallest percentage difference between the subperiods and the whole
period). In this way, we assigned scores from 1 to 8 according to the place occupied
by each measure in each event detected. Thus, we have eight scores for each
indicator corresponding to the mean and the standard deviation for the four
subperiods.
In Table 5 we report the results of adding the eight scores for each one of the
eight credibility indicators. As can be seen, the marginal credibility is the measure
with the lowest score (i.e., with a better detection of the events). Among the
logit models, the best one seems to be the one that uses the interest rate
differential between Ireland and Germany as the explanatory variable. It must
be pointed out that the logit using the interest rate differential between Ireland
and United Kingdom appears to be a good enough indicator in relative terms,
and particularly when we look at the mean differences around the events of
August 1986 and February 1993. Likewise, the drift-adjustment method shows
a very similar behaviour.
Table 5: Global Scores from the Credibility Indicators (15 previous days)
Credibility Indicator Score
Marginal Credibility. (MC) 19
Logit. Interest differential (Ireland/Germany). (L4) 26
Drift-adjustment Method. (DAM) 34
Logit. Exchange rate (IRL/DM). (L1) 37
Logit. Interest differential (Ireland/UK) (L6) 38
Logit. Distance to the central parity. (L3) 40
Logit. Distance to the upper band. (L2) 42
Logit. Exchange Rate IRL/UK. (L5) 52
Note: A lower score implies a greater sensitivity of the credibility indicator.
In Figure 7 we have considered for each one of the seven indicators the mean
and the standard deviation separately. Thus we have added, on one hand, the
four mean scores, and on the other hand, the four standard deviation scores,
corresponding to the four events selected. The closest position to the origin of
the marginal credibility measure indicates that it seems to be the best predictor
during the fifteen days prior to the four selected events.
Furthermore, it can be observed that even though the drift-adjustment method
and the logit models using the interest rate differential with respect to both the
United Kingdom and Germany show good mean scores, overall they rate behind
the marginal credibility. This is because the latter perform quite well in terms
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Figure 7: Scatter Diagram of Scores in Mean (m) and in Standard Deviation
(s) for the Credibility Indicators
Notes: DAM = Credibility indicator based on the drift-adjustment
method.
L1 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the IRL/
DM exchange rate.
L2 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the
distance to the upper band.
L3 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the
distance to the central parity.
L4 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the Irish-
German interest rate differential.
L5 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the IRL/
UK exchange rate.
L6 = Credibility indicator based on logit model with the Irish-
British interest rate differential.
MC = Marginal credibility indicator.170 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
V  CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have provided some new evidence on the credibility of the
Irish pound in the ERM. Its main contribution is the use of several credibility
indicators, some of them never applied before to the Irish case. This allows to
strengthen the results obtained in this paper. We also analyse a longer period
than that considered in previously available studies, covering the 21 November
1983-17 February 1997 period. Moreover, we have carried out a simple com-
parison of the predictive quality of the different indicators just before the main
events of the history of the ERM.
Although there exists some differences among the results across measures,
we can point out several common conclusions. In particular, our results suggest
credibility gains (i) after the realignments of the Irish pound on 4 August 1986,
on 12 January 1987 and on 1 February 1993; (ii) after the broadening of the
fluctuation bands to ±15 per cent on 2 August 1993; and (iii) around the devalu-
ation of the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo on 6 March 1995. On the
other hand, we detect some occasional reductions in credibility, notably before
the monetary turmoil registered in September 1992 and after the Italian lira
rejoined the ERM on 25 November 1996.
These results in turn suggest that the August 1986 realignment in response
to the weakness of sterling outside the ERM helped credibility by making the
exchange rate sustainable, opening a period of exchange rate stability for the
Irish pound until 1992. Indeed, since 1987 the Central Bank adopted a “franc
fort” strategy based on a rigid peg to the Deutschmark and total commitment to
ERM parities (see Walsh, 1993a). This is particularly noticeable, since from
1987 there were two important developments in the EMS: the German unification
(that imposed a massive asymmetric shock on the EMS) and the removal of the
existing capital controls in some EMS countries. However, when the sterling
left the ERM in September 1992 and depreciated against the Deutschmark, the
“franc fort” policy was shown to lack credibility and speculative pressures forced
a new realignment of the Irish pound in February 1993.
With the widening of the ERM bands in August 1993, the Central Bank
obtained a greater degree of flexibility in determining exchange rate policy and
the probability of speculative pressures was reduced. This allowed the authorities
to easily accommodate the sharp depreciation of sterling relative to the
Deutschmark, registered at the end of 1994 and early in 1995, in contrast with
the 1992 episode (Walsh, 1995). However, when the Italian lira rejoined the
ERM in November 1996, leaving sterling out of the ERM, the scenario of Ireland
satisfying the Maastricht criteria but the United Kingdom opting out of Economic
and Monetary Union temporarily reduced the credibility of the Irish pound.
Finally, the comparison of the indicators used in this paper shows that theON THE CREDIBILITY OF THE IRISH POUND IN THE EMS 171
marginal credibility measure seems to be the best to capture the main events of
the sample period. Therefore, the use of an econometric technique that allows
the parameters to change along time seems to be quite appropriate for the study
of credibility in a target zone (i.e., stabilising interventions by the central banks,
speculative movements by private agents, and realignments modify the
parameters of the process along the period studied).
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